Volume 45
Issue 4 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 45,
1940-1941
5-1-1941

The Reign of Law
William S. Culbertson

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
William S. Culbertson, The Reign of Law, 45 DICK. L. REV. 243 (1941).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol45/iss4/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

Dickinson Law Review
VOL. XLV

MAY, 1941

NUMBER 4

THE REIGN OF LAW
By

WILLIAM S. CULBERTSON*

I.
In our more than twenty countries in the Americas we find a baffling diversity
of laws which are often in conflict. Statutes and decrees have multiplied in untold
numbers. Precedents have been laid down by thousands of judges; interpretations
have been declared by thousands of officials. Volumes of decisions and volumes of
comments have been written. The laws of the countries which we represent seem
to have the variety of the Amazonian jungle, the transitoriness of a mirage on the
Chilean pampas, and a barrenness of the morasses south of the Beagle Channel.
What unity is there in this mass of legal fact and fiction?1 Is justice merely
a shifting concept that changes under the influence of time and place? Or are
there some principles which underlie all the conflicting scenes of legal life? Are
there ultimate norms and standards hidden in our array of nationalistic laws?
The ancients were troubled by these questions. Men in every age have sought
to know the origin and the nature of law. We, too, are seekers. The search
which we, the delegates to this meeting of the Inter-American Bar Association, are
to institute is not merely an intellectual venture appealing to our reason, but a
practical work which, if successfully accomplished, will lay the secure foundation
of inter-American understanding and strengthen our influence in the post-war
world. My emphasis then today will be, not on laws, but on law.
*Address before the First Conference of the Inter-American Bar Association. Habana, Cuba,
March 26, 1941. Mr. Culbertson was Vice-Chairman of the Delegation of the Pennsylvania Bar
Association and a delegate of the American and Federal Bar Associations. He is a member of the
Franklin County Bar Association. Formerly he was Vice Chairman of the United States Tariff
Commission, American Minister to Rumania, and American Ambassador to Chile. His home is a,
Charmian, Pennsylvania.
lCp. .ON L. FULLER, THE LAw IN QUEST OF ITSELF, (Chicago, 1940),
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II.
A paradox of our times is the decline of law in the midst of the enactment of
many laws. Laws have multiplied under the impact of narrow nationalism, class
politics, and personal ambition for power. No country in the Americas (or in the
world fox that matter) has escaped the evil effect of these tendencies nor are
lawyers in a position to disclaim a fair share of the blame for them. The result is
that, overburdened by mountains of laws, law itself is breaking down.
Let me enlarge a little on these tendencies which are world-wide in their
influence. They have, in the first place, affected national law. We have witnessed th.- infiltration and spread of ideas in derogation of civil rights and the
rights of private property.2 It is a curious development that these ideas seem to
have becoine more effective politically in countries which are economically immature or in countries which are suffering from abnormal economic conditions. In
the Ameticas, as well as elsewhere, the collectivism of Marx and Lenin has its
defenders.
I would be the first to agree that law without orderly social change becomes
tyranny. But reform without due process of law, reform by force and confiscation,
is retrog:es~ion. It begins as a rule with an attack on private property. Then,
follows inevitably an attack on personal rights. The interrelationship between
human rights and property rights is often not realized until encroachment by government o'n the former begins. In fact, it usually happens that the very groups in
the population for whose benefit property rights are attacked are the groups whose
personal rights are in the end most seriously infringed. It is for this reason that
the laboring classes in Great Britain have rejected the doctrines of Lenin and are
the uncompromising enemies of Hitler.
The violation of law by a government does not nullify law. 3 It merely controls by force a particular situation. The greatest menace to civilization is a government which considers itself above law.
Contributing also to the breakdown of national law is the assumption of heavy
economic responsibilities by governments without a corresponding development
of judicial control and administrative efficiency. Frequently there is not an adequate appreciation of due process of law and fundamental rights, guaranteed by
an independent judiciary. In many cases there are legal forms and phrases which
are nullified by political realities. Under the inspiration of nationalistic and
socialistic ideas, governments minimize the place of the individual in the social
order and preach their own omnipotence by propaganda.
ZCp. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW, on property rights in primitive communities.
3
Cp. E. SCHWIER, CATHOLIC SOCIAL THEORY, trani. by B. Landheer. St. Louis, 1940, on the

theories of Thomas Aquinas and St. Augustine.
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III.
The tendencies which are breaking down law have, in the second place, affected international law. They have resulted in some cases in the virtual denial of the
existence of international law, especially the law of diplomatic protection. Governments seek to avoid responsibility for their unjust acts by the argument that
national law is always superior to international law. They deny all protection
against the collective force of the State. In part this situation results from a failure to distinguish between the substantive and the procedural aspects of international law. It can be shown, I believe, by the great mass of authorities, writers
and findings of international tribunals, as well as by the decisions of national courts,
that there ate accepted principles of substantive international law which protect
and guarantee the personal and property rights of aliens who cross frontiers.'
Here and there differences of interpretation exist, but no serious dispute exists
over basic ptinciples which fix the responsibility of nations with respect to the
prope-rty and personal rights of aliens within their borders.'
It is when we turn to the question of procedure that the political element
enters and law begins to break down. This is due to the fact that nations have not
set up adequate courts, tribunals or commissions for the purpose of applying to
particular cases the accepted principles of substantive international law. Therefore, the only resort, once there has been a denial of justice in the offending
country, is a political appeal to that government either directly or through the
diplomatic channels.
Obviously, this procedure may not be satisfactory. Foreign offices are burdened with a variety of issues, and their views with reference to the merits of a
particular case may be colored by other matters which may seem for the time
being more important. Nevertheless, it is an accepted principle that the nationals
of a cou ity are entitled to the support of diplomatic interposition for the purpose
of protecting under international law their personal and property rights in foreign
countries, and the ineffectiveness of this procedure in some cases does not modify
one jot the substantive rights of an injured alien under international law.
IV.
War follows in sequence the breakdown of international law. Somewhere
in Plutarch we read that the laws speak too softly to be heard in the noise of war.
In war the laws are silent. 6 Unhappily they are not only silent; they are for4Grotius was the first one to stress the possibility of a super-national law which was based
upon the community of states.
5
Except, naturally, in case of nations which deny fundamental individual rights altogether.
6
"Silent enim leges inter arma," CICERO, PRO MILONE, 4.
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gotten. Men learn the immediate advantage which may come to favored groups
from the use of force. Conceptions of justice, order and impartiality are repudiated and law is set at naught.
Forces of destruction have been loosened by the present war-forces which
are not only destroying material things but which are undermining the social and
political restraints which are the accumulated results of civilization. They are
giving impetus, if not sanction, to the above-mentioned destructive tendencies.
They arc ignoring principles of law and weakening respect for law.
We live then in an age which has forgotten first principles. Even lawyers
seem to have forgotten first principles. Laws are like raw clay in our hands which
we seem unable to mould into the useful pottery of our every day life. We have
no philosophy of law to guide the shaping of a new social order.
V.
We should again reaffirm and give life to the simple truth that the reign of
law is supeme both over individuals and over governments. W. A. Robson in
his book 'Civilization and the Growth of Law" says (271-3):
"There are many different conceptions of the nature of juridical
law. 'Each shows us a picture of some ultimate basis, beyond reach
of the individual human will, that stands fast in the whirl of change
of which life is made up. This steadfast ultimate basis may be conceived as the divine pleasure or will or reason, revealed through a
divinely ordained immutable moral code. It may be put in the form
of some ultimate metaphysical datum which is so given us that we
may rest in it forever. It may be portrayed as certain ultimate laws
which inexorably determine the phenomena of human conduct. Or
it may be described in terms of some authoritative will for the time
and place, to which the wills of others are subjected, that will deriving its authority ultimately and absolutely in some one of the preceding forms, so that what it does is by and large in no wise a matter
of chance.'
"The liberation of the human mind from the cramping influence
of religious assumptions respecting the nature of the universe; the
destruction of authoritarian dogmas concerning the sanctity of law
and the behaviour of physical matter; the banishment of sprites,
demons, angels, gods, witches, and wonder-workers of all kinds to
the realm of myth and legend; the substitution of rational analysis
for a belief in supernatural intervention and miraculous interference
in the affairs of daily life; the awakening of a spirit of patient and
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impartial enquiry into the processes of Nature; the belief that the
behaviour of all phenomena is subject to the operation of known or
knowable causes and effects; the recognition that the laws of men
are what men make them and the laws of Nature what men discover
them to be: all this constitutes a supremely important movement in
the evolution of the human race. It forms, one may say, the most
essential step toward freedom and knowledge and power that the
human mind has yet taken.
"No less impressive is the craving to discern some ultimate
foundation of truth and certainty on which to rest the laws of Nature
and of man. All through the ages and still today men have sought
a rock upon whose stubborn sides the waves of doubt and disbelief
could beat in vain and on whose surface the ravages of time would
leave no mark. To discover by the light of reason a substratum of
ultimate and unchanging truth, and to know, again by reason, that it
would stand for all time impregnable against the assaults of reason;
such was the aim of the ancient Greek philosophers who lived and
held their discourse more than two thousand years ago. Such is still
the aim of those who hold aloft the torch of reasoned thought today."
Scholars in the ancient world and in later times, scholars trained in both the
Anglo-American and Civil systems of law have discussed the origin and nature of
law. Law, they severally tell us, comes either from God or from reason or from
experience.
1. God. Plato began his "Laws" with a reference to the divine origin of
law.' Evcn when we have rejected the sacrosanct conceptions of law which controlled when the human spirit was subservient to magic and fear of the supernatural, we find persisting with tenacity the belief that the universe is governed by
a moral force; that we live in an ordered world; and that any elimination of the
divinc from law leads to the unpleasant conclusion of an atheistic world.8 In our
sophisticatcd age, we like to avoid the question whether there is a universal reason
or a universal moral law. Personally, I find no inconsistency between the recognition of a divine law-giver and the acceptance of a rational system of law. Moreover, I doubt whether from a purely practical point of view man can, especially
in this age, dispense with the moral or religious9 element in the administration of
law.
7

"Atbenian Stranger. Tell me, Strangers, is a God or some man supposed to be the author
".(Jewett's TranslAtion,
of your laws? Cleinias. A God, Stranger; in very truth a God ....
Dialogues of Plato).
80. WILLMANN, GESCHICHTE DES IDEALISMUS, (2nd ed. Brunswick, 1907).
9I of course do not mean ecclesiastical influence.
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2. Reason. In the first century Cicero said: 10
". .. What is more divine, I will not say in man only, but in all
heaven and earth, than reason? And reason, whtn it is full grown and
perfected, is rightly called wisdom. Therefore, since there is nothing
better than reason, and since it 'exists both in man and God, the first
common possession of man and God is reason. But those who have
reason in common must also have right reason in common. And
since right reason is Law, we must believe that men have Law also in
common with the gods. Further, those who share Law must also
share Justice; and those who share these are to be regarded as members of the same commonwealth."
"In civilized countries," says Roscoe Pound,"
"Mtn are compelled to administer justice by formulas. These
formulas are designed to express ideas of right and justice and as a
means to promote right and justice. But there is always danger that
we forget those ideas and lose sight of those ends and treat the formulas as existing for their own sake. Since the time of the Stoics, men
have appealed to 'Nature' to save ethical, political, and juristic thinking from this danger; and by 'Nature' they have meant reason and
general principles of right. The appeal to reason and to the sense of
mankind for the time being as to what is just and right, which the
philosophical jurist is always making, and his insistence upon what
ought to be law as binding law because of its intrinsic reasonableness,
have been the strongest liberalizing forces in legal history."
Blackstone believed that the human mind could subjectively discover, so far
as they are necessary for the conduct of human relations, "the eternal immutable
laws of good and evil."' 2 Jeremy Bentham poked fun at Blackstone's law of
'0 DE LEGIBUS (Loeb translation) p. 321. Cp. Sec. 1 of the Institutes of Roman Law by Gaius,
translated by Edward Poste, (Oxford, 1904):
"The laws of every people governed by statutes and customs are partly peculiar to itself,
partly common to all mankind. The rules established by a given state for its own memersare peculiar to itself, and are called jus civile; the rules constituted by natural reason
for all are observed by all nations alike, and are called jus gentium. So the laws of the
people of Rome are partly peculiar to itself, partly common to all nations; and this dis.
tinction shall be explained in detail in each place as it occurs."
liPound, Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (1911) 24 HARVARD LAW REvIEW,
591, 608.
2
1 Cp. SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND, Vol. 1, Intro-

duction, Sec. 2:
"Human law must not contravene nature--This law of nature, being coeval with mankind,
and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding
over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if
contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority,
mediately or immediately, from this original."
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nature but he was quite as abstract and as dogmatic on urging his objective test of
right and wrong in law and legislation; namely, "the greatest happiness of the
greatest number."' 13 Both of these writers had implicit faith in reason's ability
to discover the ultimate standards of law and to apply them to human society.
I could not in a volume, much less a speech, review the literature" on natural
rights and law of nature. I may be called old-fashioned for even mentioning them.
But "natural rights" played a mighty role in the creation of the American states.
A mere sense of gratitude should impel us to respect their memory and it might
even invite us to consider whether vie have achieved the social ideals which were
the promise of the days of the great liberators and patriots who found their inspiration in the law of nature. Should we yield to the new ideologies, less adapted
to our social and economic needs, before we give reality to principles which were
written into our republican constitutions?
3. Eyperience. The historical school of law undertakes to discover the principles of justice and right from human experience. It was a reaction against the
codification movement and its arbitrary rules which lacked a sufficient historical
foundation. Principles of law, it argues, have become established through the
trial and error of history. The pendulum of experience has, as it were, finally
come to rest at standards of conduct which the community accepts as right. Conclusions of right and wrong expressed in custom and in the cases decided by judges
throughout the years are the rules which mankind recognizes as law. We associate
with this school such names as Friedrich Karl Savigny 5 and Sir Henry Maine.
4. Other theories of law are current-philosophical, historical and analytical. ' r Some of them are products of nationalistic and socialistic movements and
are to be judged for what they are worth as part of the propaganda of these movements and as attempts to give a philosophic basis to economic or political programs. I am not willing to classify as a philosophy of law the suggestion that
laws are merely a working basis of human existence and that justice is determined
by the pragmatic test of whether or not it works. Nor do I accept as a philosophy
lI
14

LESLIE STEPHEN, THE ENGLISH UTILITARIANS (Putnam's Sons, 1902),
CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING, (Oxford, 1931); W.

page 235 et req.

R. INGE, LIBERTY
AND NATURAL RIGHTS, (Oxford, 1934); GEORGE DOUGLAS CAMPBELL, 8th Duke of Argyll, THE
REIGN OF LAW, (London, 1867); RoscoE POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW,
(Yale University Press, 1922) ; JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY
OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (Harvard University Press, 1927); C. H. W. JOHNS, THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE LAWS OF BABYLONIA AND THE LAWS OF THE HEBREW PEOPLES, (Oxford,
1913); CHARLES FOSTER KENT, ISRAEL'S LAWS AND LEGAL PRECEDENTS, (Scribner's Sons, 1907) ;

0.

VON GIERKE, JOHANNES ALTHUSIUS UND DIE ENTWICKLUNG DER NATRRECHTLICHEN ST4ATSTHEORIEN, (4th ed. Breslau, 1929); J. CHARMONT, LA RENAISSANCE DU DROIT NATUREL, (Paris,

1927).
ISKARL SAVIGNY,

(London,
1831).
16

OF THE VOCATION OF

OUR AGE

FOR LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE,

MODERN THEORIES OF LAW, (Oxford University Press, 1933).

DICKINSON

LAW REVIEW

the materialistic concepts of law that law merely reflects the system of production
and economic power-Ltlations which exist in a society in any given time.17
The amechanical positivist theories of law have had considerable vogue.18
They have been sharply criticized and the German jurist, Bergbohm, has even
shown that they have taken over parts of the theory of natural law. The sociological
theory of lw also has its followers. It at least has the merit that it aids us to
discover the inadequacy of positive law. Moreover, the results of its analysis supplementa the vagueness of natural law. 19
In seeking a theory of law we sooner or later come back to the conception of
freedom. Immanuel Kant thought that he gave us an adequate answer. Freedom,
he argued, is not the antithesis of law; it is the highest txpression of law. Man is
free as an ethical subject, but he is governed by a system of law imposed upon
himself.20
VI.
Necessarily my review of the theories of law has been sketchy. I will be
content if it has served to help to stimulate thought and discussion among the
lawyers of the Americas. I do not expect agreement. For some lawyers one theory
will be more persuasive than others. In my opinion, those thinkers have the
best of the argument who hold that there are laws-great principles of human
relationships-which men in civilized countries obey whether there are sanctions
or not. They include at least a workable respect for civil and property rights and
for contract obligations; also due process of law not only in suits between man and
man but also in suits to which government is a party. The application of these
principles Lhange; they themselves do not change. They define the relation of
man to man; of government to man and man to government, and of government
to government. Nationalism, socialism, or capitalism do not modify the approach
17

FERDINAND

LASALLE,

UEBER VERFASSUNGSWESEN

(1862),

cp. CHANG,

THE MARXIAN

THEORY
18 OF THE STATE, (Philadelphia, 1931).
1n Europe Kelsen was one of the main exponents of a legal positivism (cp. his REiNE
RECHTSLEHRE, 1934), and John Austin for the common law world, (LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE,
London, 1869).
19
EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW, (Cambridge, 1936), and
NICHOLAS SERGEYEVITcH TIMASHEFF, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW, (Cambridge, 1939).
20KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF MORALS (The Harvard Classics, Volume 32):

"As a rational being, and consequently belonging to the intelligible world, man can never
conceive the causalty of his own will otherwise than on condition of the idea of freedom, for independence on the determining causes of the sensible world (an independence
which Reason must always ascribe to itself) is freedom. Now the idea of freedom is
inseparably connected with the conception of autonomy, and this again with the universal
principle of morality which is ideally the foundation of all actions of rational beings,
just as the law of nature is of all phenomena," Cp. Article on Kant in Encyclopedia
of the Social Sciences, Macmillan Co. (1932).
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which they compel. Nationalistic, communistic, or individualistic creeds or systems can distort them but they rise above restraints and abuses and finally triumph.
Legislativw law should seek to proclaim these fundamental rules of conduct and
to apply them to the changing needs of our time. No difference how far short
of the ultimate standards of justice the authorities of our different countries fall,
we need the guidance of these ultimate standards to make efforts toward improvement in the social order worth while.
VII.
Whether we like it or not we are destined to live in a world of many laws.
Government is playing and will play an increasingly important role in the regulation of human activities. This tendency can be, but need not be, destructive of
ultimate principles of law in an enlightened society. In fact, government can and
should become a force, not destroying as it is doing in many places today, but
preserving and protecting the realm of individual right in which law reigns.
Unfortunately the great principles of law, even when accepted in theory, are
often distorted in their application. Personal and political factors intervene. Law
is a human institution. Public officials in dealing with both national and international questions often seek an excuse for not applying principles of law to a
particular case when they would readily admit the soundness of the principles in
the abstract or even in the particular case if their political objectives called for the
support of the principles.
We are here in Habana to compare laws. Let us compare, not our bad
law, but our good laws. We are also here to seek in our systems of law a common
basis for living in peace and in cooperation. The civilization of a community of
human beings cart be measured by its laws. I do not mean merely the statutes
which it enacts or decrees from time to time, but also its acceptance and enforcement of those minimum standards of conduct for men and governments which
reason and experience in all nations and in all ages have been wont to associate
with an ealightened society. Not only individuals but governments violate at
their peril these ultimate standards of justice, impartiality and fair dealing.
Dr. Albert M. Justo of Argentina observes in the introduction of a recent
21
work:
"Comparative law shows the way to arrive at an understanding
of the world's great juridical systems. This method enables us to
get away from the regionalism or the conservatism in which as a rule
21

'Perspectivas De Un Programa De Derecho Comparado," El Ateneo, Buenos Aires, 1940.
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the law-making process unfolds.
"Far from favoring a unilateral conception of the law, we think
it indispensable, in this period of international confusion, to fight
for a reciprocal understanding of the systems in force in the American countries in order to orientate the legislative reconstruction toward a frontierless juridical order."
Can ve ever realize a juridical order without frontiers? If we look superficially only at laws, we cannot. But if we look behind the laws, we will find the
unity of law-a unity of principles which give life and power to both AngloAmerican and Civil law and which give us a common frontier in the universe of
our hopes and aspirations.
VIII.
I have tried to speak today, not as a citizen of the United States, not as a
citizen of cht Americas, but as a citizen of that commonwealth of men everywhere
in which law should reign. Even if we should succeed in discrediting the theories
of law which condemn law to slavery under nationalistic and socialistic creeds, we
will still hear plausible arguments for regional or inter-American law. We should
not yield to this temptation. Isolation is no more an intelligible policy for the
hemisphere than it is for a nation.
I recognize the contributions which jurists and statesmen throughout the Americas have made to the clarification and development of law and this effort should be
encouraged, but at times in former conferences of the American states attempts have
been made .o have local and specialized conceptions of law proclaimed as interAmerican law. We will not fall into this error if as such cases arise we remind
ourselves that fundamentally there is no such thing as a system of Inter-American
law as distinguished from law in and among all nations; that the principles of
justice which we may proclaim and codify do not differ from the principles which
22
apply to human relations in all the continents.
PolitLal and military leaders on Continental Europe and in Eastern Asia are
today seeking unity through force. Instruments of power and empire! Force has
2

2
Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, said at the Eighth International Conference of American
States, Lima, Peru, December 10, 1938:

.......

Nor has the earnest search for world order under law been confined to any

one portion of the globe. The developments which have taken place in the Western
Hemisphere have been a part of a mighty stream of new ideas, new concepts, new attitudes of mind and spirit, which has coursed and ramified, with differing degrees of vigor
and success, throughout the world. We have made important contributions to that stream,
and have, in turn, been nourished by it." Cp. Mr. Hull's address on TsE SPIRIT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, (Nashville, Tenn., June 3, 198).
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It has been provided with a philosophy and

Even in, these uncertain times when many hesitate, awaiting the outcome of
battle, we at least should not falter in giving our answer. Our answer to unit)
through foice is unity through law. It is a unity as old as the Hebrew prophets
and as young as the hopes and aspirations which spring up daily in the hearts of
the millionis who love peace with justice. It comprehends in its ample scope not
only the peoples of the Hemisphere but all the nations of men. It offers security
and prosperity within nations; understanding and peace among them. If it be said
that I am visionary, if it be said that tanks and bombers do not permit us now
to dream of a better world, I reply" 'tis not what man does which exalts him, but what man would do!"
HABANA, CUBA

WILLAM S. CULBERTSON

